The definition of “arms race” subtly shifted somewhere between the hush of a Pentagon briefing room and the excitement of a Silicon Valley keynote. It used to refer to submarines floating beneath polar ice and missiles in silos. These days, more electricity is consumed by rows of humming servers in rural Oregon, Virginia, and Inner Mongolia than by entire cities. There are no bunkers containing the weapons. They are seated in data centers.
As this develops, it seems as though those in charge haven’t decided how concerned to be. The way American officials discuss AI is similar to how their forebears discussed uranium. Years ago, Vladimir Putin declared that the person in charge of AI would “rule the world,” a statement that frequently comes up in Senate hearings and think-tank panels. It is half quoted and half feared. The rest of the world watches like spectators at a match whose rules no one could agree upon, while Beijing pours money in and Washington pours more.

The fact that this race is largely invisible is what makes it peculiar. The desert is scarred by a nuclear test. A press release or perhaps a benchmark that has been leaked on a forum is the result of an AI breakthrough. Transformers are humming in the distance, contractors smoking in the parking lot, and a chain-link fence that gives away very little outside one of those new hyperscale data centers in Loudoun County. It appears to be a warehouse. It could be a weapon.
No one anticipated that energy would be so important. Hydroelectric power from the Tennessee Valley powered the Manhattan Project; today’s frontier models run on whatever grid can keep up, and there are fewer and fewer of them. Due in part to the fact that computer demand has exceeded planning, electricity prices are rising in some areas of the United States. It’s possible that chips won’t be the true bottleneck of the coming ten years. Watts are the unit.
The military aspect is another, and most people would prefer not to consider it. Early versions of lethal autonomous weapons, or drones that choose their own targets, already exist. An AI drone “killed” its human operator in a simulation that a U.S. Air Force official once described before walking away. The fact that the story was believable enough to go viral indicates something, regardless of what actually transpired during that test. Researchers at organizations like the Friends Committee on National Legislation are constantly cautioning that incorporating AI into nuclear command structures could reduce decision-making time to nearly nothing, making a crisis a reflex.
It’s difficult to ignore how the discourse has changed in just two years. AI safety was primarily a topic of discussion among scholars and a few uncomfortable founders in 2023. These days, it can be found in NATO communiqués, defense appropriations bills, and the subtle language of advanced chip export restrictions. What Nvidia can sell to China is restricted by the United States. China manufactures its own. Every action appears defensive. When combined, they appear to be an escalation.
It’s still unclear if this race will result in a treaty, a breakthrough, or something messier. The cold logic of mutually assured destruction kept the old arms race in check. So far, this one doesn’t. The lack of brakes, rather than the machines’ speed, may be the most unsettling aspect.
