Seeing Keir Starmer struggle to keep this together makes me feel a little uneasy. It’s not that he’s performing poorly; in fact, the diplomacy has been methodical, which is uncommon for a British government under such pressure. It’s more that he inherited an almost ridiculous situation. A waterway he cannot personally open, a war he did not start, and an American president who constantly tells Europe to “go get your own oil.” In his cautious legal manner, Starmer is attempting to turn everything into something sober.
Currently, the coalition includes more than 40 nations. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates are among the Gulf states and former NATO allies that typically occupy opposing sides of the room. On April 2, Yvette Cooper presided over the first significant online meeting. Since then, military strategists have convened in London to draft a plan that resembles a maritime insurance plan rather than a war strategy. Mine-sweeping comes first, followed by protection for commercial tankers and a gradual restoration of trust for anyone willing to send a ship through.
Credit: YT
It’s a dramatic departure from Washington. Trump has stated unequivocally that he believes the strait is Europe’s problem, and his Truth Social posts advising allies to “learn how to fight for yourself” caused a stir in European capitals. Starmer has not reciprocated. He’s let the quiet do the talking. Even though Downing Street would never explicitly state it, the choice to form this coalition outside of NATO and US command is a statement in and of itself.
The peculiar thing is how unremarkable Starmer sounds when he discusses it. He kept returning to energy bills during his three-day trip to the Gulf, which included Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. domestic petrol prices. inflation of food. The framing has an almost domestic feel to it, as though the Strait of Hormuz is a boiler issue that he has been asked to resolve. His body language was formal but modest when watching the video of him meeting Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah. He appeared worn out. Before his plane landed back at Stansted, he appeared to be aware that the ceasefire might end.
And, roughly speaking, it did. The strait was closed again within hours, according to Iran’s Fars news agency, which blamed an Israeli breach in Lebanon.
The plan’s fundamental flaw is that the coalition’s entire structure is based on a ceasefire that no one can truly trust. Insurance contracts, convoy procedures, and mine-clearing operations are all irrelevant if Tehran decides to cut off power once more tomorrow. Furthermore, the operation lacks U.S. naval power and is dependent on voluntary resources from member states.
The awkward issue of timing is another. The majority of the physical work needed to reopen the waterway had already been completed by US strikes by late April. Critics in Europe have begun murmuring that Starmer’s coalition is responding to a crisis that the Americans, despite their bluster, essentially resolved on their own terms. The UK-led force might end up acting more like a long-term insurance policy than an active intervention, providing shipping firms and Gulf exporters with a sort of ongoing assurance.
However, something seems to be changing here. Even if it doesn’t quite work, having a British prime minister in charge of a 40-nation, non-NATO, non-American military alliance is not insignificant. Starmer is seen by Gulf leaders as more predictable than Trump, which is considered diplomatic capital in 2026. Nobody yet knows if he can turn that into a long-term structure or if this is just another coalition that dissolves with the next ceasefire. The battle, according to Starmer, would “define us for a generation.” It’s at least defining him for the time being.
